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Abstract: 
In this perspective article, the author analyses the eventual efficacy of recently passed Insolvency and 
Bankruptcy Bill in India. The author ascertains that the Bill in its current form encourages liquidation 
at the cost of financial restructuring. An opinion is established based on secondary research that the 
Bill fails to provide adequate representation to certain key stakeholders. The author highlights a lack 
of clarity in the Bill regarding the appointment of executants. Certain lacunae in the Bill that may 
impede its overall effectiveness are explicitly identified. The issue of conflicts between various 
stakeholders is debated in the context of current Bill. The author draws upon cross-country 
experiences to suggest remedial measures that address current impediments in the successful 
implementation of the Bill. 
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1. Introduction 
In an environment where NDA government has failed to get key bills approved in the Rajya 
Sabha, it is saddening to note that the government has lost an opportunity in the recently 
passed Insolvency and Bankruptcy Bill (the “Bill”). This Bill was one of a small number of 
legislations where the government was able to build a political consensus and muster enough 
votes to ensure safe passage.  
Insolvency and Bankruptcy is an entry covered in the seventh schedule under concurrent list 
in the Indian constitution allowing both State and Centre governments to develop the 
legislative frameworki.  Prior to Insolvency Bill, the regulatory environment in India for 
managing bankruptcies was extremely complex and messy. At least six different regulationsii, 
often at odds with each other in terms of process and intended objectives, governed the 
management of insolvency process. It was hardly surprising that bankruptcies lingered for 
ages in such a regulatory environment seriously impairing the claims of numerous 
stakeholders that are part of insolvency proceedings. The average time to resolve an 
insolvency proceeding in India at 4.3 years was far higher than the time taken in the 
developed economies (see Table 1). In fact, in a World Bank study, India ranked 186th on the 
list of 200 nations where data was availableiii (see Table 2). The process of closing businesses 
(dissolution of companies), even on a voluntary basis, was a cumbersome process requiring 
court supervision and approval. Capital providers (Banks, Bondholders, and Financial 
Institutions) were adversely impacted by elongated timelines and their grievance did attract 
significant media attention in the recent times owing to large scale NPA crisis. However, the 
adverse impact of prolonged insolvency proceedings on employees and operational creditors 
(goods and service providers) went often unnoticed.  
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The process for a comprehensive bankruptcy reform was initiated with the setting up of 
Financial Sector Legislative Reforms Commission, led by Justice Srikrishna in 2011. In 
2014, Ministry of Finance instituted the Bankruptcy Legislative Reforms Committee, led by 
T. K. Viswanathan. The Viswanathan committee submitted a two-volume report in 2015. The 
economic rationale and design features of a new legislative framework were covered in the 
first volume and the draft bill was laid out in the second volume. A modified version of this 
bill, incorporating public comments, was tabled in the Parliament in late 2015. After the bill 
was tabled, the Joint Parliamentary Committee was set up and the Joint Parliamentary 
Committee submitted its report which included a new draft of the law.   
 
2. Concerns with the current Bill 
It was imperative in such a scenario that a comprehensive and effective single framework is 
promulgated that safeguards interest of all stakeholders. The current insolvency Bill, despite 
its long drafting history, falls woefully short on the following six counts. 
A. Liquidation Preference 
The new Bill has a marked preference to liquidations versus reorganization thereby 
defeating the stated objective of maximizing asset value. The Bill mandates that a 
specialized personnel appointed to manage insolvency resolution process completes 
this exercise within 180 days. A timeframe of six months (or nine months including 
an extension) is grossly inadequate to prepare a robust revival plan that is agreed upon 
by a super-majority of creditorsiii. Even in developed economies like the United States 
with experience of tackling economic, harmonisation and  legislative challenges 
involved in the bankruptcy process for over thirty yearsiv , an eighteen months periodv 
is provided to evaluate the viability of corporate restructuring and reorganization. 
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Such arbitrarily decided resolution period of six months without any consideration to 
the size of a firm, its recent financial performance, asset coverage, the number of 
creditor claims or severity of default will lead to a hastily arranged liquidation 
proceeding resulting in significant impairment of intrinsic enterprise value.  
 
It is also important to consider that Indian economy is still largely a ‘bank-oriented 
economy’ rather than a ‘market-oriented economy’ and a large amount of corporate 
debt is owned by Banks. In a market-oriented economy, creditors often have the 
option to participate in the liquidation process thus ensuring optimal price discovery 
and arresting transfer of value. It is extremely unlikely though, given current 
regulatory and accounting environment for banks that the banks will be able to bid for 
liquidated assets. In a fire-sale liquidation process, the value will be appropriated by 
vulture firms from banks (and ultimately taxpayers). Aghion et al. (1992) question the 
conclusion that a competitive auction will inevitably lead a firm to be sold at the 
highest price. They posit that auctions work well if raising cash for bids is easy and 
there is plenty of competition among several well—informed bidders. However, even 
in the most advanced Western economies, these conditions will often not be met, and 
they believe that such conditions are even less likely to be satisfied in developing 
economies like Eastern Europe. If research findings of Aghion et al. hold true, Public 
Sector Banks, unsecured creditors, workmen, and minority shareholders will suffer 
the most in liquidation via cash-auction approach. 
 
B. Limited or No Representation to Key Stakeholders 
Workmen and operational creditors do not enjoy the same status as financial creditors 
in the new Bill. In the event of an alleged default, the financial creditor can initiate the 
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insolvency proceedings without intimation to the debtor. In a similar instance, an 
operational creditor is required to deliver a demand notice and a corporate debtor can 
stall insolvency proceeding by merely disputing the veracity of such claim. It is 
almost certain that a debtor will dispute the legitimacy of a claim when facing the 
spectre of insolvency proceedings and consequently operational creditors (typically 
micro and small enterprises lacking financial and legal wherewithal) will continue to 
suffer inordinate delays in the recovery process.   
 
Workmen have no representation in the insolvency resolution process and are at the 
mercy of creditors committee with disparate interests. Workmen dues are prioritized 
only for a period of twenty four months. Wages and dues of contract workers are 
prioritized for an even smaller period of twelve months. The Bill assumes that 
financial creditors, who may very well be secured creditors with sufficient asset cover 
and no risk exposure, are the only appropriate decision makers for creditors 
committee. This inaccurate assumption may lead to adverse consequences for 
workmen. For example, consider a company with assets of Rs. 100, total liabilities of 
Rs. 75 but with interest coverage of less than 1 due to temporary and transitory cash-
flow disruption. If such a company defaults on its debt obligation, creditors will 
pursue the path of liquidation as they will have a full recovery of debt and their 
financials will appear better with reduced NPAs. Their immediate economic interests 
will disregard the appreciation for long-term viability of the company. The challenge 
faced by displaced workmen, particularly those who have attained a certain age and 
will find reskilling challenging, hasn’t received any consideration in the Bill. Graham 
et al. (2013), using data from the Census Bureau's Longitudinal Employer Household 
Dynamics Program, suggest that one year after bankruptcy, the magnitude of the 
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decline in annual wages is 30% of pre-bankruptcy wages. The principle of equity 
would mandate that a weaker stakeholder is offered more protection by law than a 
stronger stakeholder, but the Bill embodies a contrary rationale.  
 
The Bill envisages an extremely limited role of government in ensuring a fair and 
orderly resolution process. In the United States, the U.S. trustee plays a major role in 
monitoring the progress of a bankruptcy case and supervising its administrationvi. The 
confidence of market participants in integrity and transparency of bankruptcy process 
is extremely essential for a well-functioning equity and debt capital market. La Porta 
et al. (1997), in their seminal work on inter-linkage between law and capital structure, 
have underlined the importance of shareholder and creditor rights in influencing the 
development of financial systems and establishing funding preferences for a country. 
Undue favouritism shown by laws to either creditor or equity participant can 
artificially skew the financing preferences and raise overall cost of capital for 
businesses. Finally, the limited participation of union and state governments in the 
bankruptcy process and creditors committee is even more questionable when their 
claims from liquidation estate are prioritized below claims of unsecured creditors. 
Recent casesvii in India provide enough evidence that defaulting firms often fail to 
remit their statutory dues and taxes for an extended period prior to default. Absence of 
active government participation in creditors committee will definitely hamper ability 
to recover maximum possible amount for taxpayers’ benefit. 
 
C. Qualifications for Key Executants Envisaged by Bill 
The key executants envisaged in the Bill to manage insolvency process are an 
Insolvency Resolution Professional (“IPR”) and a Liquidator. IPR is responsible for 
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managing the company, appointing and coordinating creditor’s committee 
proceedings, entering into contracts on the behalf of the company, securing interim 
financing for the company and completing many other critical tasks with substantial 
financial and strategic implications. It is glaring therefore that the Bill does not 
specify minimum qualifications necessary for the appointment of Insolvency 
Resolution Professional (“IPR”). The lack of minimum qualifications or past 
experience becomes critically important as IPRs can be nominated by either a creditor 
or a corporate debtor itself. Lack of clarity on qualifications necessary for IPR 
appointment may lead to the appointment of IPRs with vested interests or IPRs that 
are in cahoots with the creditor or corporate defaulter. Since IPRs assume the role of 
management at the commencement of insolvency proceedings, it is absolutely 
essential that IPRs have character and qualifications that ensure impartial attention to 
the interest of all stakeholders and not only financial creditors or corporate debtor. 
Claessens and Clapper (2002) suggest that creditors in a market-based economy 
benefit more from aspects of bankruptcy law aiming to overcome collective action 
problems among creditors. They also suggest that there may be more scope for 
conflicts between the role of banks as creditors and equity holders in a bank-based 
system. Their research findings support my case for the appointment of an able and 
impartial IPR to ensure an impartial and efficient bankruptcy resolution process. 
 
The Bill does not mandate any past experience or minimum recovery criteria for 
appointment as Liquidator. A capable liquidator can make correct decisions regarding 
the quantum of asset sale (bulk sale or smaller packages), sale strategy (private versus 
public) and auction technique and bidding mechanism (English Auction versus Dutch 
Auction, fixed versus moving bid increments) and maximize proceeds for liquidation 
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estate. Liquidator’s experience and expertise in managing complex liquidation process 
by structuring appropriate disposal strategy is critical for the success of bankruptcy 
process. 
 
D. Minimum Threshold for Default Amount 
The Bill does not specify any minimum threshold for defaulted debt either as a 
percentage of total debt or otherwise. This can result in a situation where a financial 
creditor commences insolvency proceedings even if less than one percentage of total 
obligations of corporate are in default. It is also disconcerting to note that the Bill 
allows a financial creditor to commence insolvency proceedings even if the debtor is 
making a regular payment on his debt but the debtor has defaulted on the debt availed 
from another creditor. This incongruity is particularly problematic in instances where 
the debtor has secured a waiver from the creditor who was directly impacted by the 
debt default. It is customary to have a minimum threshold clause in debt covenants 
along with a cure period provision in cross-default situations. The Bill in its current 
form allows debtors to override such provisions and create nuisance value of 
catastrophic magnitude for the debtor and its shareholders. A debtor against whom 
insolvency proceedings have publicly commenced will face massive challenges in 
running its enterprise in ‘ordinary course’. The firm’s ability to secure any new 
financing will be impaired, its ability to secure goods and services from suppliers will 
be curtailed, the morale of employees will be adversely impacted, prospective buyers 
will delay or cancel their planned purchase, and the loss of goodwill in the 
marketplace will have prolonged repercussions. Eckbo and Thorburn (2009) rightly 
opine that a poorly designed code exacerbates rather than attenuates costly conflicts 
among security-holders and risks destroying company value by misallocating control 
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over corporate resources. Considering such grave consequences, it is shocking to note 
that the Bill failed to include a minimum threshold amount. 
 
E. Disclosure of  Interest and Intent of committee members and other executants 
The Bill does not mandate that creditors forming part of creditors committee and IPR 
disclose their interests and intent to other committee members and debtor. Bankruptcy 
laws in many developed nations demands full disclosure of all instances may give rise 
to actual or potential conflicts of interestviii. The fact that committee members may 
have a conflict of interest can result in a lack of adequate representation of all 
stakeholders. Committee members with conflicted interest may dominate the 
committee proceedings and entertain high-risk strategies at the cost of other 
stakeholders. Harner and Griffin (2011), based on their study of 296 chapter eleven 
bankruptcy casesix in the United States, suggested that cases with single creditor 
committee are more likely to result in a plan of liquidation. These cases were also 
more likely to provide distributions of less than fifty percent of claim value to 
unsecured creditors.  
 
F. Fraudulent Asset Conveyance 
The Bill fails to adequately address fraudulent conveyance of assets and doesn’t bring 
cross-border assets of defaulters within its ambit. The “look back” period for 
fraudulent conveyance is limited to one year for unrelated parties and two years for 
related parties. Keeping in mind our recent experience with wilful default in case of 
more than 3000 accounts (Table 3), clearly establishing the premise that business 
failures and bankruptcies are often planned events In India, a longer look back period 
is needed. Liquidator and Trustee have neither been mandated nor empowered to look 
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for cross-border assets of defaulting parties, thereby impeding full recovery potential 
for stakeholders. 
 
3. Conclusion 
Bankruptcy Law is an important tool for a well-functioning society and an ideal bankruptcy 
process must provide justice to all stakeholders.  Distribution of claims needs to be impartial 
for all stakeholders including creditors, workmen, taxpayer and the debtor. A hasty 
liquidation of an enterprise with long-term economic viability, especially when liabilities 
exceed assets, will lead to losses for both secured creditors and unsecured creditors. 
Reorganization in such instances can generate future cash-flows that will inure to creditors, 
protect workmen employment, and generate tax revenue for the government. Unfortunately, 
the Bill in its current form has some serious lacunae and is unlikely to meet the desired 
objective of balancing the interests of all the stakeholders and maximization of debt recovery. 
The government needs to address these shortcomings in the Bill at priority by way of an 
amendment. The timeframe for resolution plan approval needs to be significantly extended 
from current 180 days. The revised timeline should not be similar across defaulting firms and 
must incorporate a classification based on total assets, the severity of default and number of 
creditor claims. Creditors committee should have mandatory representation from employees. 
The bonafide of any disputes regarding a claim of an operational creditor should be 
established by Adjudicating Authorityx. Union government should take an active 
participation in the insolvency proceedings and protect the integrity of bankruptcy resolution 
process by instituting a program similar to The United States Trustee Program. Detailed 
criteria, including minimum qualifications, need to be laid down for the appointment of key 
executants like IPRs and Liquidators. The government needs to specify a minimum threshold 
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of default amount that will trigger initiation of insolvency proceedings. Members of creditors 
committee and other external executants should be mandated to provide a sworn declaration 
clearly specifying their interests and perceived or real conflicts that may arise from their 
participation in the process. The rules and procedures regarding fraudulent conveyance of 
assets need to be strengthened. Finally, a mechanism for ascertaining cross-border assets 
needs to be incorporated. Otherwise, the Bill will fail to increase ease of doing business, will 
not accelerate GDP growth as contemplated and will only result in higher cost of equity 
capital for businesses. 
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Table 1: Descriptive data statistic on insolvency timelines for 200 countries
Mean 2.6
Standard Error 0.1
Median 2.5
Mode 2.0
Standard Deviation 1.1
Sample Variance 1.2
Kurtosis 0.5
Skewness 0.7
Range 5.8
Count 200
Largest(n) 6.2
Smallest(n) 0.4
Data Source: World Development Indicators, World Bank, Doing Business project (http://www.doingbusiness.org/)
Last Updated Date: 02-05-2016
Table 2: List of bottom 20 countries ranked on time to resolve insolvency  
Rank Country Name Time in Years (2011 -2015 data)
200 Sao Tome and Principe 6.2
199 Cambodia 6
198 Micronesia, Fed. Sts. 5.3
197 Ecuador 5.3
196 Vietnam 5
195 Suriname 5
194 Niger 5
193 Myanmar 5
192 Gabon 5
191 Burundi 5
190 Central African Republic 4.8
189 Turkey 4.5
188 Kenya 4.5
187 Iran, Islamic Rep. 4.5
186 India 4.3
185 Kuwait 4.2
184 Syrian Arab Republic 4.1
183 Venezuela, RB 4
182 Slovak Republic 4
181 Oman 4
Data Source: World Development Indicators, World Bank, Doing Business project (http://www.doingbusiness.org/)
Last Updated Date: 02-05-2016
Table 3: Suit-filed accounts of Rs. 25 Lacs and above as on 31-Mar-2016 
Category of Credit 
Grantor (CG)
Total No. of CGs No. of CGs No. Of Records No. of CGs No. Of Records
FOREIGN BANKS 17 12 291 5 12
NATIONALISED BANKS 16 3 460 13 2881
PRIVATE SECTOR BANKS 20 9 1096 11 625
SBI AND ITS ASSOCIATE 
BANKS
7 5 639 2 187
Grand Total 60 29 2486 31 3705
Rs. 1 Crore & Above (Willful Default) Rs. 25 Lacs & Above (Willful Default)
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Endnotes: 
                                                          
i
 Entry 9 in List III - Concurrent List, Article 246 –Seventh Schedule to the Constitution  
ii
 Companies Act, 1956; Sick Industrial Companies (Special Provisions) Act, 1985; Securitisation and 
Reconstruction of Financial Assets and Enforcement of Security Interest Act (SARFAESI) Act, 2002; 
Recovery of Debts due to Banks and Financial Institutions Act, 1993; The Presidency Towns 
Insolvency Act, 1909; and Provisional Insolvency Act, 1920. 
iii
 The Bill mandates that all decisions of the committee of creditors shall be taken by a vote of not less 
than 
seventy-five per cent of voting share of the financial creditors 
iv
 The current United States bankruptcy code was enacted in 1978 which generally became effective 
on October 1, 1979. The current code completely replaced the former Bankruptcy Act of 1898, also 
referred as Nelson Act. 
v
 Refer 11 USC § 1121(b) of US Bankruptcy Code. 
vi
 Bankruptcy Factsheet – US Department of Justice , https://www.justice.gov/ust/bankruptcy-fact-
sheets/us-trustees-role-chapter-11-bankruptcy-cases 
vii
 Refer Karnataka High Court Judgment in Kingfisher Airlines v/s CIT, ITA No. 165 of 2012 
viii
 Rule 2019(a) of the Federal Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure in United States provides that any 
entity or committee representing more than one creditor or equity security holder and, unless 
otherwise directed by the court, every indenture trustee, must file a verified statement with the court 
disclosing their interest. 
ix
 A chapter of the US Bankruptcy Code that provides for reorganization, usually involving a 
corporation or partnership. A chapter 11 debtor usually proposes a plan of reorganization to keep its 
business alive and pay creditors over time. 
x
 Adjudicating Authority in the Bill means National Company Law Tribunal constituted under section 
408 of the Companies Act, 2013 
 
 
 
 
 
